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Epistemic communities and two goals of  
delegation: hormone growth promoters in the 
European Union  
Claire A Dunlop 
The delegation literature tells us that decision-makers delegate power to agents to achieve efficiency or 
credibility (or both). Critically, however, the successful delivery of each of these implies very different 
levels of control over their agent by the principal. This paper deploys principal–agent modelling to 
explore how this logic works with epistemic agents. It explores the implications of two epistemic 
communities’ contrasting de facto independence from European Commission decision-makers for the 
delegation goals satisfied in formulating policy on hormone growth promoters. Analysis supported the 
view that to deliver policy efficiency an epistemic community must have low autonomy from the 
political principal. Policy credibility was achieved when decision-makers selected an epistemic 
community whose views were socially legitimate. 
ECISION-MAKERS DELEGATE POWER 
to agents with at least one of two objectives 
in mind: efficiency or credibility (Majone, 
2001; 2005: Chap 4). This paper’s point of departure 
is that the ability of epistemic communities to create 
knowledge, which is at once socially relevant and 
imbued with scientific credibility, gives these actors 
the unique potential to deliver on both goals. Princi-
pal–agent analysis is used to illuminate what epis-
temic communities offered when decision-makers in 
the European Commission (EC) were attempting 
both to ban the use of hormone growth promoters in 
meat and the import of treated meat and to prove 
their long-term commitment to a precautionary ap-
proach to food safety. 
Decision-makers may seek efficiency and credi-
bility simultaneously. However, the delegation lit-
erature suggests that the successful delivery of each 
implies very different levels of principal control over 
their agent. For policy efficiency, a close alignment 
between the preferences of the principal and agent is 
expected. But societal confidence that a plan for the 
future is made before that future arrives and that a 
policy will continue in the long term, and is there-
fore credible, requires that the agent remains aloof 
from today’s political principals whose temporal ho-
rizons are short term. Thus, this paper is centrally 
concerned with the implications of an epistemic 
community’s autonomy from decision-makers for 
the advice they give and, critically, the delegation 
goals they are able to satisfy. This is explored by 
comparing the contributions made by two scientific 
working groups to whom the EC delegated for ad-
vice on growth promoters. 
These committees are conceptualised as two dis-
tinct epistemic community types, each distinguished 
by the level of operational and informal autonomy 
they enjoyed from their political principals. We 
know that epistemic communities were originally 
conceived as naturally evolving, self-regulating  
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enclaves of experts (Haas, 1989; 1992a). Such ‘evo-
lutionary’ epistemic communities demand high lev-
els of de facto autonomy from the decision-makers 
who call upon them for advice (see Maggetti (2007) 
for an excellent discussion on de facto versus formal 
autonomy). In the burgeoning epistemic communi-
ties literature, however, an additional type of expert 
enclave has also become apparent. Some epistemic 
communities exist whose members have been delib-
erately selected by decision-makers and whose day-
to-day work is closely controlled and prescribed 
(Verdun, 1999). Such ‘governmental’ epistemic 
communities’ control over the knowledge they pro-
duce is circumscribed and subject to external socio-
political pressure. What is the impact of these differ-
ent levels of independence, and the degrees of 
autonomy they imply, upon epistemic agents’ abili-
ties to deliver efficiency and credibility for their 
principals? Two main postulates, derived from the 
assumptions of the delegation literature, are exam-
ined. First, ‘governmental’ epistemic communities, 
whose de facto autonomy is limited, will offer more 
efficient delegations than their ‘evolutionary’ coun-
terparts. Secondly, the ‘evolutionary’ agents’ fuller 
de facto independence from decision-makers makes 
them better able to secure credibility for a policy 
than their ‘governmental’ counterparts. Analysis 
supports the expectation that governmental epis-
temic communities produce more efficient delega-
tions than their evolutionary counterparts. The 
hypothesis on policy credibility, however, is not 
supported. Rather, the case study analysed here sug-
gests that an additional social dimension of policy 
credibility, emphasising the degree of value align-
ment between the expert agents and wider society, 
warrants further attention. 
This research makes four contributions. The pa-
per is situated within the growing EU literature de-
ploying agency analysis (e.g. Pollack (1997) and  
Franchino (2002) on the EC; Ballman et al. (2002) 
on comitology; Egan (1998) on standardisation 
bodies and Blom-Hansen (2005) on cohesion pol-
icy). Despite this healthy corpus of work, less at-
tention has been given to the application of agency 
logic to the advisory relationships between experts 
and decision-makers in the EU (a notable exception 
is Elgie (2002) on the European Central Bank), al-
though a growing interest in the framework in sci-
ence and public policy studies suggests that 
crossover to the EU literature is only a matter of 
time (Science and Public Policy has been at the 
forefront of this agenda, see Guston, 1996, 2003; 
Braun and Guston, 2003 (special issue in this  
journal)). This paper contributes to this trend by 
applying principal–agent analysis to those groups 
of experts in the EU delegated to most numerously1 
but whose role in remains surprisingly opaque, the 
EC advisory committees (for the beginnings of a 
literature see Christiansen and Larsson, 2003; Rhi-
nard, 2002; Quaglia et al., 2008). 
Related to this, the present paper’s second contri-
bution is to explore hypotheses on credibility delega-
tions. While the translation of efficiency studies of 
industrial organizations into political science has 
reached an advanced stage, the application of the 
monetary literature on policy credibility to theoreti-
cal and empirical questions in political science has 
only just begun. This paper examines the orthodox 
thesis which links policy credibility to agent auton-
omy: a view that is increasingly actualised in the 
proliferation of independent regulatory agencies 
(IRAs) (Gilardi, 2002; Maggetti, 2007; van Thiel, 
2004). Analysis suggests that explanations which ar-
ticulate a ‘social logic’ (McNamara, 2002) for credi-
bility by emphasising the importance of social 
legitimisation in delegation design and in the type of 
agent independence which prevails, require further 
attention. 
The third contribution concerns the epistemic 
community concept itself (Haas, 1992a). Despite be-
ing the conceptual name to drop in studies of techni-
cal issues in comparative politics and international 
relations alike, very little work has been done to in-
terrogate and develop the concept theoretically.2 The 
use of principal–agent modelling enables a move 
away from simply examining experts’ role in filling 
knowledge deficits to viewing them as policy actors 
engaged in politicised relationships with decision-
makers. In this way, analysis attends to the potential 
political impacts these communities can have and 
the instrumental uses to which their reputations and 
knowledge are put. 
The paper’s fourth and final contribution is em-
pirical. Drawing upon in-depth interviews with sci-
entists and EU officials, the less well-known side of 
the high-profile hormone growth promoter contro-
versy, concerning the delegation to experts for ad-
vice and construction of regulatory science, is 
revealed. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as fol-
lows. The first section outlines the epistemic com-
munity concept addressing why and how decision-
makers delegate to them. The second section deline-
ates two types of epistemic community (governmen-
tal and evolutionary) distinguished by their levels of 
de facto autonomy from decision-makers and out-
lines hypotheses on what each community type of-
fers decision-making principals in terms of 
efficiency and credibility. The third section consid-
ers case study evidence, which is analysed in the 
next section. The conclusion discusses the paper’s 
implications for the literatures on the epistemic 
communities and on delegation. 
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(What) do decision-makers delegate to  
epistemic communities and why? 
Before dissecting the delegation goals and the possi-
ble contributions that epistemic communities make 
toward their achievement, we should first be clear 
about what actually constitutes an epistemic com-
munity and what they can offer decision-makers. An 
epistemic community is a group of professionals 
with a legitimate claim to highly specified policy-
relevant knowledge on scientifically complex issues. 
Such communities embody a belief system around 
an issue which contains four knowledge elements: 
[1] a shared set of normative and principled be-
liefs, which provide a value-based rationale for 
the social action of community members; [2] 
shared causal beliefs, which are derived from 
their analysis of practices leading or contribut-
ing to a central set of problems in their domain 
and which then serve as the basis for elucidat-
ing the multiple linkages between possible pol-
icy actions and desired outcomes; [3] shared 
notions of validity – that is, intersubjective, in-
ternally defined criteria for weighing and vali-
dating knowledge in the domain of their 
expertise; and [4] a common policy enterprise. 
(Haas, 1992a: 3) 
This is an anthropomorphic conceptualisation of 
knowledge (Radaelli, 1997: 169) where those who 
carry the ideas are central to the analysis; ‘ideas 
would be sterile without carriers’ (Haas, 1992a: 27). 
Thus, to identify an epistemic community is to iden-
tify a set of actors with the professional and social 
stature to make authoritative claims on politically 
pertinent and socially relevant issues of the day. 
These claims find expression through a blend of 
substantive knowledge (elements [2] and [3] of 
Haas’s definition) and socio-political convictions 
(elements [1] and [4]) resulting in policy-relevant 
knowledge (Haas, 1992a). 
Decision-makers have access to a huge amount of 
information. However, policy-oriented knowledge 
from authoritative actors is a scarce resource. By  
virtue of the useable knowledge they produce,  
epistemic communities possess a rare product which 
decision-makers need to transcend the two classic 
dilemmas of efficiency and credibility. This paper’s 
starting point is that, decision-makers have signifi-
cant incentives to institutionalise these actors in bu-
reaucracies. This usually takes the form of advisory 
committees. Thus, the relationships between these 
actors can be conceptualised as being between prin-
cipal and agent. 
Before outlining hypotheses of how epistemic 
communities contribute to the two delegation goals, 
the view that decision-makers and epistemic com-
munities can be bound together in delegation rela-
tionships requires elaboration. Three issues require 
particular attention:  
• the point at which decision-makers delegate to 
epistemic communities;  
• the type of agents these collectives represent; and  
• the type of power that is delegated to what are es-
sentially advisory bodies. 
We must establish under what conditions we would 
expect decision-makers to depend upon an epistemic 
community. Identifying what motivates decision-
makers to delegate in the first place tells us about the 
strength and longevity of principals’ commitment to 
their relationship with an epistemic community. De-
cision-makers have a variety of reasons for consult-
ing epistemic communities, some more political than 
others (Haas, 1992a: 15). Where substantive and po-
litical uncertainty is high, experts can delineate 
cause-and-effect relationships and help define states’ 
interests. In such cases, we would expect the delega-
tion to be short-lived. After an initial peak, the deci-
sion-making principals’ dependence on an epistemic 
agent would decline as substantive enlightenment 
progresses and political preferences become clearer. 
However, scope conditions exist which demand 
less one-sided, transitory relationships. Decision-
makers also require epistemic communities for in-
strumental purposes to help formulate policies to le-
gitimate fixed political preferences (Haas, 1992a: 
15). Such delegations are particularly common 
where issues are marked by distributional conse-
quences that put pressure on decision-makers to ne-
gotiate high levels of conflict in order to deliver 
policy commitments to favoured groups or to justify 
themselves to losing constituencies. Here, epistemic 
communities and their knowledge product become 
transformed into the political tools which principals 
need to shut down unfavourable policy options. 
Epistemic communities can also depoliticise deci-
sion-making. In situations where decision-makers 
need to convince citizens of their commitment to a 
policy stance whose benefits in the future outweigh 
those of the present, epistemic communities carry 
the brand of objectivity and neutrality. By delegating 
to them for policy advice, decision-makers re-assure 
sceptical citizens and lend credibility to their com-
mitment to a policy stance. 
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In examining the type of agents that epistemic 
communities represent we need to know about these 
groups’ commitment to their policy role. Given that 
these experts are not employed by governments, 
why would epistemic actors accept a contract to of-
fer advice to principals who are not legally bound to 
follow it? Put simply: what incentives do epistemic 
communities have to become agents? 
The two sides of these actors’ belief systems sug-
gest that epistemic communities do not require legal 
or direct pecuniary incentives to be interested par-
ties. As creators of knowledge, they are essentially 
‘residual claimants’ (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972); 
long-term shareholders in a product. Moreover, be-
cause of their socio-political beliefs these are experts 
who want rather than need to be in the policy arena. 
They are self-selecting policy actors driven by nor-
mative and policy beliefs. Thus, the voluntary status 
of these advisory bodies is not synonymous with 
partial commitment. Indeed, the strength of their 
commitment is such that, once granted entry to the 
decision-making arena, withdrawal is likely only if a 
community faces substantive challenges (i.e. anoma-
lous evidence) which demand a re-consideration or 
revision of its worldview (Haas, 1992a: 18). 
Finally, we must gain an awareness of the type of 
power that can be ceded to epistemic communities. 
These are not full delegations; their advisory status 
ensures that these experts will never be the ultimate 
decision-makers. In theory, epistemic communities 
will always be on the receiving end of a contingent 
contract where the principal controls the final out-
come and retains the ability to veto advice that does 
not ‘fit’ with their preferences. However, the power 
balance between principal and agent is more nu-
anced than this interpretation suggests. While ac-
cepting the principal’s power of ultima ratio, in 
several ways the decision-maker–epistemic commu-
nity relationship does resemble the incomplete con-
tract model that principal–agent analysis aims to 
illuminate. 
First, the specialised goods that epistemic com-
munities have at their disposal gives these agents a 
substantial informational advantage. When it comes 
to highly politicised issues, this information can se-
cure substantial political property rights for epis-
temic agents. Secondly, the objectivity associated 
with these policy actors and the knowledge produc-
tion process ensures that, in practice, decision-
makers must at least pay lip service to the epistemic 
agents’ ‘truths’. Finally, through bureaucratic insti-
tutionalisation, principals effectively confer author-
ity on one set of epistemic actors and invest in one 
paradigm at the expense of another. Breaking these 
ties would, at the very least, necessitate the costly 
process of recruiting new epistemic agents from a 
finite supply. 
How might delegations to epistemic communities 
deliver both efficient advice and credible policies to 
principals? The answer to this lies in principals’ 
ability to identify, structure and manage the unique 
blend of the socio-political values and substantive 
knowledge embodied by the two distinct sides of an 
epistemic community’s belief system. Regarding ef-
ficiency, the principal–agent literature is clear: deci-
sion-makers delegate authority for policy advice to 
agents with greater substantive expertise than their 
own (Sappington, 1991). However, substantive in-
puts alone will not secure efficiency. The agents’ 
socio-political beliefs are key and, crudely stated, a 
delegation is assumed to be efficient where the ad-
vice delivered by the agent contributes to the satis-
faction of the principal’s policy preferences. 
Epistemic communities’ normative convictions 
and policy ideas represent key assets in this pursuit 
of efficiency. Where an epistemic community’s 
socio-political beliefs on an issue are aligned or can 
be engineered to ‘fit’ with those held by decision-
makers we can expect the knowledge they produce 
to be geared toward the delivery of decision-makers’ 
policy preferences. 
Political scientists have been reminded recently 
that decision-makers also delegate to enhance the 
credibility of their policy commitments (Majone, 
2001; 2005). Rooted in monetary policy analysis, the 
credibility challenge decision-makers face is to con-
vince their own principals – embodied by the me-
dian voter – that their economic policies are time-
consistent (Kydland and Prescott, 1977; Rogoff, 
1985). Thus, voters must be convinced not only that 
decision-makers will bind their successors to protect 
the public interest but that they too will exercise 
self-control while in office and reject expediency. 
The best way for political decision-makers to secure 
the confidence of the citizens is to surrender control 
over monetary policy to reputable expert agents, 
who operate in independent central banks, and 
whose commitment to conservative economic targets 
cannot be politically tainted. 
This orthodox interpretation of credibility treats 
citizen confidence as a function of process-oriented 
factors associated with the central bank and bankers 
(Hayo, 1998). Bankers’ reputations, transparency in 
how they reach their economic targets and the inde-
pendence of the central bank itself insulate monetary 
policy from political whims (Barro and Gordon, 
1983). Agents’ autonomy from their principals is the 
means to the end of policy credibility:  
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…an agent who simply carries out the princi-
pal’s directives cannot enhance the latter’s 
credibility. (Majone, 2001: 104) 
Independence stymies expedient decision-makers, 
and enables central bankers to ‘lock in’ political 
principals and their successors to fiscal decisions 
and so promote policy consistency and stability over 
the long term. The epistemic communities’ produc-
tion of professionally validated knowledge suggests 
that, by definition, these actors have the potential to 
secure policy credibility on such terms. 
This emphasis on the agent’s reputation and inde-
pendence from the principals has been readily trans-
lated to political science accounts of policy 
credibility. However, scholars have been keen to 
point out that delegations ‘do not occur in a political 
vacuum’ (McNamara, 2002: 55). The variation in 
the mandates of central banks alone serves to remind 
us that independence is found in the eye of the be-
holder (De Haan and van’t Hag, 1995). The result 
has been a focus on developing methodological tools 
which interrogate the exogenity of agents and offer 
ways to empirically operationalise the concept of in-
dependence (Gilardi, 2002). Maggetti (2007) has 
advanced this measurement of independence most 
effectively by highlighting the importance of de 
facto independence as opposed to the formal inde-
pendence associated with mandates (see Gilardi 
(2002) for an operationalisation of this). Because de 
facto independence characterises the autonomy ex-
perienced by agents on a day-to-day basis, focusing 
on this takes us beyond the statutes and formal rules 
and into the heart of the informal norms and habits 
that underpin the principals’ relationships with their 
agents. Specifically, by bringing into relief the prac-
tice of independence as opposed to the principle, we 
illuminate the extent to which agents find their work 
subject to external pressure and interference at an 
operational level. 
Thus, we would expect agents that possess a high 
degree of de facto independence to act ‘without ex-
ternal constraints’ (Nordlinger, 1987: 361 cited in 
Maggetti, 2007: 272) and, in such circumstances, we 
would expect policy credibility to be safeguarded. 
Conversely, agents whose working practices are di-
rectly influenced by political principals’, and experi-
ence greater constraints on their freedom, would 
produce limited credibility for their principals. Such 
external pressure will not simply be exerted down-
ward from political principals but may also bubble 
up from the regulatees in society who are targeted by 
a regulation (Pedersen, 2006 cited in Maggetti, 
2007: 272). 
Delegating to ‘evolutionary’ and  
‘governmental’ epistemic communities 
Decision-makers’ motivations for delegating knowl-
edge production can be the result of a desire for both 
policy efficiency and credibility. However, the or-
thodoxy, which associates successful delegations of 
efficiency and credibility with opposing levels of 
principal control and agent autonomy, leaves it open 
to question whether or not a single epistemic com-
munity could satisfy both goals simultaneously. In a 
bid to ascertain the extent to which such dual satis-
faction might be possible, and to illuminate the role 
of principal control/agent autonomy in the delivery 
of these goals, the present paper compares the satis-
faction delivered by two types of epistemic commu-
nity distinguished by their de facto autonomy from 
decision-makers. 
In the original formulation of the concept, Haas 
(1989; 1992a) presented an epistemic communities’ 
autonomy as connected to the substantive knowl-
edge which these communities create. In this view, 
political principals are not in a position to impose 
their preferences or version of the ‘truth’ because the 
experts’ first loyalty is to their professional norms 
and collective identity. Not all epistemic communi-
ties are the same, however. The empirical studies in-
spired by Haas’s thesis suggest that more subtlety is 
required when addressing the issue of external influ-
ence. In particular, substantial variation can be found 
in the degree of informal autonomy some epistemic 
communities enjoy from the decision-makers they 
advise. 
The studies suggest there are two types of epis-
temic communities: labelled here as ‘evolutionary’ 
and ‘governmental’, which vary according to the 
strength of their collective identity. Variation in their 
de facto independence is revealed in two respects: 
political influence on their composition and political 
participation in the knowledge production process. 
The first are those originally envisaged by Haas, 
and enjoy a high degree of autonomy from the deci-
sion-makers they advise. Termed here ‘evolutionary’ 
epistemic communities, these groups have devel-
oped organically over time within professional are-
nas and through their members’ own networks (e.g. 
Adler, 1992; Haas, 1992b). Though representatives 
of these established networks can, for a time, be-
come institutionalised in bureaucratic positions, their 
movement into the political arena is incidental to 
their existence. Such agents, and the paradigms of 
thought they represent, had a life before the political 
principals’ intervention and have one after it. These 
are communities in the classical sense where  
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members have a long-term commitment to a com-
mon outlook (MacIver, 1917: 23–24). This strong 
collective identity ensures that knowledge produc-
tion in evolutionary communities is predominately 
guided by research questions set by the experts, to a 
timescale agreed by them and with little involvement 
by decision-makers in the report drafting process. 
The second epistemic community type concern 
groups of experts assembled in the policy arena, and 
are marked by the low de facto independence from 
the political decision-makers who have brought 
them together (e.g. Dunlop, 2009; Verdun, 1999). 
The membership of these ‘governmental’ epistemic 
communities is vetted and engineered by political 
principals. These are less communities in the classi-
cal sense and more associations established for the 
pursuit of a defined task (MacIver, 1917: 23–24). 
The absence of a collective history means that, al-
most by definition, governmental amalgams lack a 
purpose beyond the task set them by their principals. 
While the content of governmental epistemic com-
munities’ belief systems remains the sum of the ex-
perts’ convictions and knowledge, these actors rely 
on the principals who created them to help guide 
knowledge production. 
While they are both still epistemic communities 
(the professional personification of four epistemic 
elements) their differing levels of operational inde-
pendence represent differences in kind that carry 
important implications for what they deliver to deci-
sion-makers. Before converting these differences 
into concrete hypotheses on efficiency and credibil-
ity, we need to be clear that we are conceiving of 
autonomy in relative rather than absolute terms. A 
governmental epistemic community need not be the 
hapless ‘plaything’ of the political principals it ad-
vises as it still to be constrained in terms of who 
produces the knowledge or how that knowledge is 
produced. While an evolutionary community is ef-
fectively independent from decision-makers, it must 
still be able to navigate the world of politics if it is to 
get its point across. 
This paper deploys principal–agent modelling to 
explore the relationship between decision-makers 
and the two types of epistemic community. The fo-
cus of agency analyses on micro-level relationships 
ensures that it sits well with the concept of epistemic 
communities, enabling the construction of two hy-
potheses. These relate each type of epistemic com-
munity to one delegation: HA on efficiency and HB 
on credibility. 
The central part of the efficiency challenge for 
principals is to structure delegations in ways that 
guards against agent opportunism or ‘moral hazard’. 
It is expected that the principals will achieve a 
higher degree of preference alignment with govern-
mental epistemic communities whose membership 
they can engineer than with their established evolu-
tionary counterparts. The immature nature of gov-
ernmental epistemic communities’ belief systems 
and their contingent research agenda makes them 
more likely to engage with an issue from the princi-
pal’s viewpoint than their evolutionary counterparts 
whose more entrenched belief systems will make 
them less adaptable to decision-makers’ agendas. On 
this basis, it is suggested that governmental epis-
temic communities provide more efficient delega-
tions than evolutionary epistemic communities (HA). 
In the orthodox view, agents must operate free 
from political interference in order to secure policy 
credibility. It is postulated that, because they enter 
the policy process with entrenched belief systems 
and established collective agendas, this high level of 
operational autonomy from decision-makers will 
make them more likely to hold an independent line 
in the face of political pressure and so deliver policy 
credibility. Evolutionary epistemic communities will 
be less susceptible to intercession by the principals 
in the production of knowledge than the newly 
formed governmental communities. Such independ-
ence makes evolutionary communities more likely to 
offer advice which will be seen as time-consistent 
than governmental ones. This leads to the expecta-
tion that evolutionary communities would score 
higher on policy credibility than their governmental 
counterparts (HB). 
Case study: the European hormones ‘saga’ 
Case selection and research design 
To explore these hypotheses, this paper examines 
the role of the two epistemic communities that ad-
vised the EC on the safety of hormone growth pro-
moters in meat, first in the 1980s and then again in 
the 1990s. Analysis is informed, and belief systems 
identified, through interviews conducted by the au-
thor with members of the two epistemic communi-
ties and decision-makers from the EC.3 This is 
accompanied by the customary analysis of the 
documentary evidence, predominately scientific re-
ports, legislation, internal reports and government 
publications. 
The hormones case has been selected for three 
reasons. First, the two epistemic community types 
are present. Secondly, the political stakes were such 
that, in both delegations the principal would be sig-
nificantly affected by their agents’ actions. Finally, it 
satisfies the pre-condition of utility models that the 
actors’ preferences are stable. Both efficiency and 
credibility challenges remained fundamentally the 
same across the two decades of the saga. On effi-
ciency, the EC delegated in search of information 
(scientific evidence) that would be sufficient to de-
liver a ban on growth promoters and close down the 
dissent of a few member states4 and major trading 
partners in a timely manner. In terms of the credibil-
ity, the aim of the EC decision-makers was to  
persuade the domestic audience, in this case the  
majority of member states and the European Parlia-
ment (EP), of its long-term commitment to  
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consumer protection. It is worth dwelling on how the 
time-consistency problem, most associated with 
monetary policy, affects environmental and health 
safety issues. The argument is a simple one. In is-
sues marked by scientific uncertainty, the knowledge 
of risk is often indeterminate and interpretations of 
what is acceptable change over time. There is often a 
strong political temptation to reverse or postpone 
costly regulations that prohibit a substance or prac-
tice and maintain policy flexibility, or good relations 
with trading partners, until such time as scientific 
evidence is conclusive. These risks are borne by the 
citizens and the consequences are potentially irre-
versible. Thus, credibility seeking decision-makers 
must plan for the future before the future arrives by 
binding themselves and future decision-makers to a 
precautionary approach in advance of any conclusive 
evidence of harm (Gollier and Treich, 2003). 
It was with these dual challenges in mind that two 
different types of epistemic community were called 
upon for advice. 
Delegation 1: the evolutionary epistemic community 
As the section title suggests, the hormones ‘saga’ 
was not a short-lived affair. It first surfaced in the 
late 1970s and continuing until the turn of the cen-
tury.5 In 1981, following high profile public health 
scares in Italy triggered by the discovery of residues 
of the known carcinogen diethylstilbestrol (DES) in 
baby food and veal served in school meals, legisla-
tion across the EU was harmonised to outlaw the 
administration of this compound and other such syn-
thetic estrogens to livestock for fattening purposes.6 
With consumer concern pushing the veal market 
to the brink of collapse and the majority of EU pro-
ducers liable to benefit from a ban, the Directorate-
General (DG) Agriculture also moved to ban all 
other hormones used for non-therapeutic purposes 
(Commission of the European Communities, 1980). 
This was put on hold by three member states,7 where 
the use of growth promoters was prevalent, and dis-
quiet from the EU’s two largest beef trade partners, 
the USA and Canada. To address this dissent, in 
1982 the EC launched a scientific investigation into 
the safety of five hormones in question to provide 
experts with ‘an opportunity to make hormones ac-
ceptable’ (Commission of the European Communi-
ties, 1982). 
DG Agriculture requested that scientists from its 
Scientific Veterinary Committee (SVC) construct a 
short-term working group. With international veteri-
nary experts on hormones already serving on this 
committee and further eminent specialists in the 
field invited to join the hormones group by the 
group’s chair, DG Agriculture had delegated to an 
archetypal evolutionary epistemic community. The 
Scientific Group on Anabolic Agents in Animal 
Production, chaired by the UK SVC representative, 
Professor Eric Lamming, was a ‘who’s who’ of ex-
perts on growth promoters in agriculture.8 As  
academic veterinary scientists, the ‘Lamming com-
mittee’ established their research question as a puz-
zle of pure science and assessed the ‘harmful effects 
to health induced by growth promoters’ via quantita-
tive laboratory extrapolations. 
These methodological commitments are reflected 
in the group’s interim report (1983) which advised 
that while intrinsically carcinogenic, the presence of 
the three naturally occurring hormones in humans 
and observance of good animal husbandry practices 
would ensure that they posed no additional risk. 
While noting that ‘vulnerable populations’ might be 
at increased risk from additional doses, the scien-
tists’ normative commitment to empiricism led them 
to the view that such risks did not warrant the policy 
of prohibition favoured by the principal (Lamming, 
1983). Thus, the degree of harm resulting from mis-
use, which had triggered the principal’s initial call 
for advice, was not part of the scientists’ analyses. 
The high degree of independence that this evolu-
tionary agent had from DG Agriculture revealed it-
self in more than the epistemic community’s socio-
political focus. In knowledge production, the princi-
pal could exercise no control over the research  
timetable. The Lamming committee was unequivo-
cal: the only limits to which the committee could 
submit were those dictated by the evidence gathering 
process. The data gaps on the two synthetic com-
pounds were such that the research would continue 
indefinitely. 
However, the scientists were off the political 
pace. Anti-hormone campaigns had been launched 
by the increasingly powerful supranational consumer 
and environmental lobbies (particularly Bureau Eu-
ropéen des Unions de Consommateurs (BEUC)) and 
the parliament’s environment and agriculture com-
mittees were conducting a wide-ranging inquiry into 
the quality of meat production (EP, 1989) Some 
member states (notably France) were even consider-
ing domestic legislation to outlaw hormones. These 
social actors were critical that the Lamming commit-
tee was not exploring the long-term consequences of 
consuming meat produced using growth promoters 
and the risks of high doses which resulted from 
over-dosage (Agence Europe, 1984; 1985a; 1985b). 
The result was that the agent was left producing evi-
dence with little policy relevance and the principal 
was under fire for allowing its work to continue.9 By 
the time scientists were prepared to report back, DG 
Agriculture had moved to prohibit both the use of 
the five hormones and third country imports of hor-
mone-treated beef (Council of the European Com-
munities, 1988). It had taken no further advice from 
its scientific group. On the verge of formally pre-
senting their final report, their work was suspended. 
The close-out meeting was cancelled and the report 
was neither formally signed-off nor published by the 
EC. Indeed technically, the working group remains 
in prorogation. 
The epistemic community’s final report was  
presented at the British Veterinary Association  
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conference in 1987 (New Scientist, 17 September 
1987), a move which involved each signatory break-
ing a legally binding confidentiality agreement.10 
This reaction to excision from their advisory role il-
lustrates the strength of this evolutionary commu-
nity’s normative and policy beliefs, that the 
laboratory evidence which found all five growth 
promoters to be safe for human consumption should 
be translated directly into policy. Going public was 
ultimately ‘non-negotiable’;11 to withhold data was 
viewed as an academic crime to the scientists which 
would have left the research process incomplete and 
made the group appear ‘suspect’.12 
Delegation 2: the governmental  
epistemic community 
In the absence of any quantitative risk assessment as 
justification, the USA and Canada characterised the 
import ban as an illegal trade barrier and the EU 
faced a 100% ad valorem duty on goods to the value 
of US$93 million. Negotiations to resolve the dis-
pute eventually reached the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) in 
March 1996. Under the WTO’s Sanitary and Phyto-
sanitary (SPS) Measures Agreement, members are 
free to choose a higher level of protection than the 
norm, provided that it can be justified on a scientific 
basis (Article 2.2). The EU’s direct contravention of 
what was a stable international scientific consensus 
on growth promoters’ safety gave the complainants a 
watertight case (JECFA, 1988). The WTO ruled ac-
cordingly. 
An unexpected concession was made, however. 
While upholding the DSB’s main ruling, in January 
1998 the WTO Appellate Body (AB) accepted that 
the use of what the EC was now dubbing a ‘precau-
tionary approach’ had been an ‘act of good faith’ 
(WTO/AB, 1998: paragraph 194). The EU was 
given leave to provide quantitative scientific as-
sessment of the risk of the individual hormones as 
residues in meat. Significantly, the AB ruling re-
minded parties that higher sanitary measures could 
be supported by non-scientific factors in risk as-
sessment: such as ‘relevant evidence arising from 
difficulties of control, inspection and enforcement’ 
(WTO/AB, 1998: paragraph 205) which take into 
account the ‘real-world’ context ‘where people live 
and work and die’ (WTO/AB, 1998: paragraph 187). 
This opened the door for the EU’s precautionary 
interpretation of the safety of growth promoters. 
With 15 months to produce the new assessments, the 
EC’s newly empowered Directorate for Consumer 
Protection and Public Health (DG Sanco) launched a 
programme of research ranging from experimental 
studies to those concerning management-oriented is-
sues of control and abuse. The findings of these, and 
an evaluation of the existing data, were to be deliv-
ered by a new working group of experts to a strict 
timetable established by officials. As with the  
Lamming committee, the nucleus of this group was 
scientists already advising DG Sanco or their mem-
ber state administrations. However, the Scientific 
Committee on Veterinary Measures Related to Pub-
lic Health (SCVPH) growth promoters sub-group, to 
give it its full title, was a consciously crafted gov-
ernmental epistemic community. 
To understand the means by which DG Sanco was 
able to select scientists whom it knew shared its 
socio-political agenda, some contextual detail is 
necessary. The SCVPH sub-group was established in 
the wake of the EC’s post-BSE (bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy) reorganisation. Under instruction 
by member states and the EP, the centrepiece of this 
had been the movement to scientific advisory com-
mittees on matters of food safety from DG Agricul-
ture to DG Sanco. The scientific committees were 
reformulated and their members recruited and vetted 
by DG Sanco. Operating under the guiding principle 
that decision-makers should have access to scientific 
evidence which looked primarily to the concerns of 
consumers, those scientists opposed to a precaution-
ary approach to public health in principle would be 
unlikely to self-select to join these committees or 
gain entry.13 
The composition of the SCVPH sub-group on 
growth promoters reflected this new approach to sci-
entific evidence gathering. This was not a micro-
cosm of experts who had worked on the growth 
promoters issue for a long time. Toxicologists 
worked alongside veterinary public health experts 
and animal welfare scholars to examine the evidence 
on growth promoters’ safety from all angles. Such 
multi-disciplinarity may have been an incentive to 
scientists to join the group,14 however, the fact that 
committee of scientists knew little of each other’s 
work meant that this group did not have their own 
substantive research agenda to pursue. 
DG Sanco directed work, with the scientists in-
structed to advise on ‘the potential for adverse ef-
fects to human health arising from administration of 
the six hormones used individually or in combina-
tions for animal growth promotion’ (Commission of 
the European Communities, 1999) within the AB’s 
limited timescale and overseen by the main SCVPH 
committee. Though Lamming’s empiricist consensus 
still held internationally, the sub-group concluded 
that all six hormones posed unacceptable risks to 
consumer health. The ‘monolithic’ scientific evi-
dence was characterized as incomplete. The rejec-
tion was justified on the basis of hormone misuse 
and export control failures that occurred in the ‘real-
world context’ (Commission of the European Com-
munities, 1999). Given humans’ different levels of 
susceptibility, the governmental epistemic commu-
nity placed the onus upon the complainants to prove 
a negative: that unknown additional risks were not 
unacceptable. 
The SCVPH has twice reaffirmed its stance (in 
May 2000 and April 2002) in response to contrary 
scientific opinions from the UK Veterinary Products 
Committee and the Codex Alimentarius. In June 
Epistemic communities and delegation in the EU 
Science and Public Policy April 2010 213 
2007, the European Food Safety Authority reviewed 
the evidence concluding that no revision to the posi-
tion was required.15 
Analysis 
This section relates the case study to each of the two 
hypotheses in turn. 
Observations on efficiency 
Governmental epistemic communities provide more 
efficient delegations than evolutionary epistemic 
communities (HA). The case study supports the 
proposition that principals achieve a higher degree 
of preference alignment with governmental epis-
temic communities than with evolutionary commu-
nities and, in doing so, increase the efficiency of the 
delegation. 
Delegation to the Lamming committee was 
clearly a case of adverse selection. Inexperienced in 
dealing with politicised scientific issues and reluc-
tant to delegate, DG Agriculture turned to an estab-
lished community of veterinary scientists whose 
socio-political beliefs on the primacy of empirical 
evidence were entirely incompatible with its own 
preference to prohibit. Though selection error was 
the fundamental cause of inefficiency, it was the 
agent’s ‘type’ that made it impossible for the princi-
pal to salvage anything from the delegation. 
The fact that DG Agriculture could not resolve 
this conflict of interest illustrates two facets of evo-
lutionary epistemic agents’ operational independ-
ence which can exacerbate adverse selection. First, 
the entrenched nature of this agent’s belief system 
left its socio-political preferences hidden. DG Agri-
culture did not gain a clear view of its agent’s em-
piricist agenda until after the interim report was 
published, by which time it was too late for the prin-
cipal to shut down its work. Secondly, the depth of 
this autonomous agent’s attachment to its belief sys-
tem frustrated compromise with political principals. 
Policy learning about the substantive and policy 
implications of ‘who’ delivers advice on trans-
scientific issues ensured that DG Sanco exercised 
close control over agent selection (for a fuller  
account see Dunlop and James, 2007: 412–415). By 
socially engineering its group’s composition, the po-
litical principal created an epistemic agent whose 
preferences on growth promoters were transparent 
and engaged with the real-world context and non-
scientific factors. This practically eliminated the risk 
that DG Sanco would receive advice which ran in-
imical to its policy agenda. 
This agent’s level of autonomy exaggerated the 
efficiency yielded. The group’s lack of collective 
history, and the heterogeneity its membership, meant 
the absence of the high level of social capital which 
had ensured a deeply entrenched socio-political 
agenda in its evolutionary predecessor. Rather, this 
group’s members’ broad socio-political commitment 
to consumer protection was malleable enough to be 
directed by DG Sanco. 
The hormones case illustrates how governmental 
epistemic communities’ relatively weak collective 
identity makes them less resistant to the principal’s 
involvement in the production of knowledge than 
their evolutionary counterparts. DG Sanco’s creation 
of the sub-group enabled it to engage with an epis-
temic agent as a partner in knowledge production 
and boost their efficiency gains. While taking advice 
from its scientists on the research gaps which needed 
to be plugged, DG Sanco kept control over the direc-
tion of knowledge production, binding the group to a 
highly specified mandate. This assumption of a lead 
role owed much to the ‘private information’ (Maskin 
and Tirole, 1990) DG Sanco held on growth promot-
ers – the result of a decade and a half of policy learn-
ing. However, DG Sanco was only able to take full 
advantage of this because of the type of epistemic 
community which it had created. The sub-group’s 
lack of collective history or established research fo-
cus made the mandate an expected and desirable di-
rection to take. An almost tailor-made knowledge 
product was the result. 
Findings suggest that efficiency was maximised 
further by the low levels of monitoring required for 
governmental epistemic communities. The close 
alignment between principal and agent belief sys-
tems had, as analysts predict, downgraded the im-
portance of the monitoring method (Brehms and 
Gates, 1999). With slippage unlikely, DG Sanco 
took a backseat, delegating oversight to a committee 
of the sub-group’s peers. The overlap between the 
membership of the main committee and the hor-
mones sub-group meant that, in effect, the SCVPH’s 
role was to act more as a sounding board than a 
manager.16 This was a highly efficient move; simul-
taneously externalising monitoring costs and ensur-
ing that the group members experienced enough 
‘agency slack’ to feel politically unbiased. 
By contrast, when the Lamming committee en-
tered the policy arena they already had control of 
knowledge production and perceived this to be their 
exclusive domain. As the long-established inter-
national experts on growth promoters, the group’s 
role as policy adviser was ‘by the way’ of the main 
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business of paradigm building. Though this domi-
nance was reinforced by the lack of guidance given 
by DG Agriculture, it was the ‘existential stability’ 
(Rhodes, 1997) of this evolutionary epistemic agent 
that ensured that the principal was entirely shut out 
of knowledge production. The committee’s substan-
tive self-sufficiency also frustrated the principal’s at-
tempt to monitor, manage and close down its agent’s 
work. This unwillingness to adapt to its principal’s 
agenda was not a political strategy. Given its basis in 
this agent’s loyalty to laboratory-based empirical 
risk assessment and a wider community of scientists, 
such resistance could be termed ‘principled shirk-
ing’.17 Intentions aside, the working group’s inability 
to compromise and its insistence on self-regulation 
illustrates that, where informal independence is ex-
tremely high, the risk of moral hazard posed by an 
evolutionary epistemic community can make it im-
possible to develop shared norms or design effective 
ex ante control mechanisms or ex post sanctions. 
Observations on credibility 
Evolutionary communities would score higher on 
policy credibility than their governmental counter-
parts (HB). While the findings show that evolu-
tionary epistemic communities’ detachment from 
decision-makers makes them more likely to hold an 
independent line than their governmental successors, 
a corresponding advantage in policy credibility was 
not the result. The case study suggests that reputa-
tion and independent operation alone were insuffi-
cient to secure the confidence of the EC’s ‘median 
voter’, namely the member states, EP and consumer 
lobby. Concerns about the long-term effects of hor-
mone consumption and the misuse of hormones 
which were not addressed by Lamming, had resulted 
in high-profile campaigns across European and an 
EP enquiry. 
Both communities were composed of scientists in 
possession of the common proxies of professional 
objectivity and, with these, could make claim to be-
ing essentially apolitical. As experts already estab-
lished in the field, the Lamming’s evolutionary 
epistemic community had by far the greater inde-
pendence from political bias of the two groups. The 
reason that this agent’s independence failed to de-
liver policy credibility is only illuminated by looking 
beyond the orthodox account of policy credibility 
toward a social account of credibility (McNamara, 
2002). The view expressed here is that a social logic 
can underpin how agents are designed and operate. 
In this way, credibility becomes a function of politi-
cal pressure and social ratification from the domi-
nant, organised interests in a society or from society 
as a whole (Hall and Franzese, 1998; Hayo, 1998; 
McCallum, 1995; McNamara and Jones, 1996; 
Posen, 1993). We are reminded that Rogoff’s central 
banker (1985) is selected, not only by dint of their 
reputation, but primarily because their commitment 
to conservatism in monetary policy matches the  
prevailing norm of the median voter. A delegation 
which fails to win the confidence of the citizens who 
are ultimately targeted by the regulation (Maggetti, 
2007: 272–273) cannot deliver policy credibility to 
political principals.18 From this viewpoint, to analyse 
policy credibility purely in terms of the formal prin-
cipal–agent relationship is to miss a key point. 
Analysis must be open to the bigger picture which 
sees agents as legitimating constructs and their out-
puts as ‘solidifying a specific set of ideologies ... 
which favour certain groups in society’ (McNamara, 
2002: 48; for a similar point see Braun, 1993). 
The first delegation to the evolutionary epistemic 
community was a technocratic19 one. It neither oper-
ated in a manner nor delivered advice which had 
been ratified by the wider society. By contrast, the 
governmental epistemic community’s composition, 
operation and advice reflected the values of the EU’s 
pre-eminent ‘social interlocutors’ and citizens 
(McNamara, 2002) who continued to back the ban.20 
If inter-subjectivity between agent and society is a 
key dimension of policy credibility what role does 
de facto independence of the agent from the political 
principal play? In what way does the principal mat-
ter? The first delegation to Lamming illustrates that 
to win credibility much rests on the principal’s trans-
lation of the public interest into a delegation. Failure 
to delegate to a socially legitimate agent left DG Ag-
riculture with an evolutionary epistemic community 
whose high degree of autonomy from it further ex-
aggerated the credibility challenge it faced. The evo-
lutionary community’s entrenched socio-political 
beliefs on empiricism ensured that it was never 
speaking the same language on risk and precaution 
as the audience judging it. With closer ties to its po-
litical principal, a greater affinity with the social au-
dience and its concerns might have been achievable. 
As it was, the agent’s stance was deeply embedded. 
Unable to prevent the agency drift, DG Agriculture 
was laid open to charges that it was not fully com-
mitted to safeguarding consumer protection in the 
long-term and the policy to ban (EP, 1989). 
In the same vein, the governmental agent’s low 
level of operational independence did not stir up the 
scepticism the orthodox view predicts. DG Sanco 
was able to keep its epistemic community focused 
upon the median voter whose confidence was 
sought. Granting its agent only marginal autonomy, 
DG Sanco prevented its advisors from falling into a 
‘credibility trap’ (Palley, 2001) where appeals are 
made to the ‘wrong’ audience (for example, to those 
in the international or professional arenas) thus re-
sulting in the loss of their domestic constituents’ 
confidence. 
High levels of de facto independence frustrated 
principal intercession in the evolutionary epistemic 
community’s production of knowledge. The fact that 
this independence did not resolve the time-
consistency problem again brings the social logic of 
policy credibility to the fore. While both communi-
ties produced knowledge which conformed to  
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professional norms (i.e. was externally consistent) 
the confidence secured by the governmental agent 
suggests that, in this case, advice also had to be in-
ternally consistent (i.e. conform to the prevailing so-
cial ‘logic of appropriateness’ (March and Olsen, 
1984)). 
The exaggerating role of de facto independence 
can again be seen in relation to knowledge produc-
tion. For example, the Lamming committee’s im-
permeable research agenda and self-determined 
timetable ensured it could not be re-oriented. This 
provoked extreme action where the principal dis-
owned its agent in a bid to salvage its own credibil-
ity. Low levels of agent autonomy in the second 
delegation enabled DG Sanco to deploy ‘commit-
ment technologies’ (Blinder, 2000), notably the re-
search question, which locked itself and the agent in 
to the socially resonant position on growth promot-
ers. This reflected the high profile investment in the 
precautionary principle which the EU audience 
wanted. 
We should be clear. This social logic does not 
discard the baby with the bathwater. The fact that 
the advice which appeared time-consistent was so-
cially embedded, and credibility was socially con-
ferred, does not render agent independence obsolete 
in the pursuit of policy credibility. Though not as 
autonomous as Lamming, the SCVPH sub-group 
could still make claims to formal independence. The 
preferences these scientists expressed were their 
own. As one member put it ‘the tail did not wag the 
dog’.21 In this light, this group may have been ‘inde-
pendent enough’ to deliver credibility. By contrast, 
the Lamming committee may illustrate what hap-
pens when an agent is too autonomous. With the 
agent able to rail against society as well as the po-
litical principal, policy credibility is reduced. 
Conclusion 
This paper responds to a research agenda recently 
launched in this journal (Braun and Guston, 2003). It 
models principal–agent relationships between two 
types of epistemic communities and decision-makers 
in the EU. Analysis illuminates much about the role 
of de facto independence and community ‘type’ in 
epistemic communities’ delivery on efficiency and 
credibility. While the hypotheses remain provisional, 
the case study suggests that governmental epistemic 
communities promise more complete contracts than 
their evolutionary counterparts for both delegation 
objectives. Of course, we should be cautious about 
generalising. The case presented here was a highly 
politicised one where the preferences of principal 
and society were strong and clear. In cases where the 
stakes are low, we may expect that the orthodox hy-
pothesis on credibility will hold as high levels of ex-
pert independence become a proxy for social 
legitimation. 
Analysis suggests that epistemic agents created by 
political principals may deliver a higher level of ef-
ficiency than their evolutionary counterparts. These 
insights into efficiency bring into relief the role 
played by agent autonomy. Each delegation was set 
on a path to inefficiency or efficiency as a result of 
how much the principal understood about how their 
political preferences might be translated by the epis-
temic community. The level of autonomy which ac-
companies each community type exaggerated the 
mismatch or match, further frustrating or boosting 
capacity for policy preferences to be met. 
It is not only this low likelihood of shirking which 
makes governmental epistemic agents a significant 
resource for decision-makers. Contrary to orthodox 
predictions, the lack of policy independence which 
makes governmental agents highly efficient may not 
dull their ability to deliver a greater level of policy 
credibility to their principals than their independent 
counterparts. Rather, the linchpin of policy credibil-
ity was the degree of alignment between society’s 
view and those of the agent. 
The primacy ascribed by the social logic to the 
agent–society relationship does not render the 
agent’s autonomy from the principal irrelevant. In 
fact, the principal becomes the link actor, who en-
sures that social interests are reflected in the mode of 
operation of the delegation. The successful or un-
successful execution of this was again sealed by the 
composition of the communities and the extent to 
which each agent’s knowledge production and inter-
pretation could be steered toward the social audi-
ence. Of course, for principals to make the most of 
this opportunity, certain scope conditions must be 
satisfied. In particular, the principal must read soci-
ety accurately, be knowledgeable enough to know 
who to delegate to and have a supply of like-minded 
experts who are willing to be recruited. 
While the extreme political independence of the 
Lamming committee exacerbated the disjuncture be-
tween its message and that of the EU’s median 
voter, this does not mean that some level or percep-
tion of independence is not required for credibility. 
Rather, it suggests that what is understood to be 
enough independence from political actors is so-
cially contingent. 
The proposition that decision-makers, seeking  
either efficiency or credibility or both, are more 
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likely to achieve their objective by manufacturing 
their own epistemic agent rather than opting for  
the relative lottery of recruiting an evolutionary one 
is an important one for the EU’s delegation-
dominated governance system. Certainly, the vol-
ume and pivotal position of advisory committees of-
fer plenty of fruitful opportunities for further 
research on delegations to epistemic agents and hy-
potheses of credibility. 
This first use of principal–agent analysis with 
epistemic communities offers a new view of these 
actors’ relationships with decision-makers, and illus-
trates that they are not simply policy shapers but can 
also be found ‘downstream’ at the delivery end of 
the policy process. To get to grips with the manner 
in which they satisfy delegation goals we need to 
sharpen the indicators of de facto independence 
identified here (political influence on community 
composition and knowledge production), to turn 
them into accurate measures of autonomy over time. 
Notably, it is unclear how path dependent the two 
epistemic community types are. For example, will a 
governmental community remain locked into its 
starting point in close proximity to its principal, or 
can we expect its independence to increase as mem-
bers form closer bonds? 
Empirical work on both theses of policy credibil-
ity (orthodox and social) is especially necessary if 
the synergies between independence, delegatory re-
lationships and social forces are to be better under-
stood. Critically, if the full story of credibility is to 
unfold, the notion of independence must be interro-
gated. Two questions appear particularly pertinent. 
When the EC delegates to an epistemic community, 
committee or even IRA in what ways is it independ-
ent? What happens to these delegations if the bal-
loon of social legitimacy holding them up bursts? 
Notes 
1.  A 1999 internal EC document numbered these committees at 
nearly 800 (Rhinard, 2002). 
2.  For exceptions to this see Dunlop (2000, 2009), Radaelli 
(1995) and Zito (2001). 
3.  The author conducted 38 semi-structured interviews with ac-
tive and retired scientists, civil servants, politicians and inter-
est group actors. In most cases, anonymity was requested. 
4.  It should be noted that only the UK was consistent in its op-
position to the ban. 
5.  See Peterson (1988) for an account up to 1988 and Princen 
(2004) for an analysis of the trade dispute. 
6.  These were three naturally occurring or endogenous hor-
mones (17ß-estradiol; progesterone; testosterone) and two 
exogenous, synthetic compounds (trenbolone acetate and 
zeranol). 
7.  Belgium, Ireland and the UK. 
8.  Interview with working group member. 
9.  Interview with working group member and DG Agriculture  
official. 
10.  16 of the 22 members felt able to put their names to the pub-
lication, though all endorsed its conclusions. 
11.  Interview with working group member. 
12.  Interview with working group member. 
13.  Interview with working group member and DG Sanco officials. 
14.  Two senior sub-group members commented that the lack of 
familiarity within the group opened up previously untapped 
networks to the individual scientists. 
15.  Opinion of the Scientific Panel on Contaminants in the Food 
Chain (CONTAM) related to hormone residues in bovine 
meat and meat products, question number: EFSA-Q-2005-
048, adopted on 12 June 2007, published in EFSA Journal 
(2007) 510, pp 1–62, available at <http://www.efsa.europa. 
eu/EFSA/efsa_locale-1178620753812_1178622336805. 
htm>, last accessed 14 June 2009. 
16.  Interview with sub-group and SCVPH member. 
17.  For more on the idea of ‘principled agents’ see Besley (2006) 
and Dilulio (1994). 
18.  The best known empirical discussion of the social credibility 
thesis concerns the high level of citizen confidence in post-
war German economic policy, This was, in part, a function of 
the fact that Bundesbank policy reflected the population’s 
‘deep-rooted’ aversion to high inflation and preference for 
price stability (McNamara and Jones, 1996; Treutler, 1993). 
19.  See Shapiro and Guston (2007: 541) for more on technoc-
racy in regulatory science. 
20.  For example, in 1997 57% of European citizens viewed the 
absence of growth promoters in meat as an indicator of food 
safety (Eurobarometer 1998, Q. 56). This was reflected in the 
precautionary stance on hormones that was maintained by 
the EP which had voted 366–0 on a resolution urging the EC 
to maintain the ban citing consumer concern, questions of 
animal welfare and meat quality as its’ rationale. A similar 
outlook was taken by the majority of member states (the main 
exception being the UK) and EU consumer alliance (BEUC, 
1996). 
21.  Interview with sub-group member. 
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